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Executive Summary
The refugee crisis in the European Union has acted as a test for the domestic policies of
its member states. This is especially true for the Netherlands. Expecting a large influx of
refugees, the Netherlands reevaluated its refugee policies. Consequently, the government
decided to close down regional asylum shelters, and discontinue what was informally recognized
as the bed-bath-bread regulation. The new refugee policy taking its place would create reception
centers for asylum applicants and failed asylum seekers working on a process for voluntary
return. The new policy would force any failed asylum seeker thought to be in noncompliance
with voluntary return measures and any unregistered migrants, to the streets. This protocol
makes these individuals homeless, and creates a variety of negative effects and costs for the
state. Also, it fails to implement any mechanism that actually ensures return. This paper
analyzes the new refugee policy, and highlights both desirable and undesirable outcomes. It then
provides alternatives, and discusses the costs and benefits of each. A recommendation is then
provided. The reopening of the shelters along with a failed asylum seeker contribution plan is
recommended as it provides the least amount of costs for the state, and allows for monitoring of
these individuals along with accessibility to government support.

1) The Netherlands’ New Refugee Policy
The Problem
On April 22, 2015, the Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Deputy Prime Minister
Asscher announced the plan to close all bed, bath, and bread shelters, ending what was known as
the “bed-bath-bread regulation” (NOS 2015). Under the premise of the new refugee policy, the
government would replace the thirty regional shelters with six reception centers, and would
require asylum seekers who are denied refugee status to comply with voluntary return measures.
The previous policy allowed individuals to stay indefinitely at the shelters irrespective of their
application status (Bahceli 2015). The new policy places these individuals who are not going
through the application or a voluntary return policy, on the street. Specifically, the new policy
gives failed asylum seekers twenty-eight days to prepare for return to country of origin after
receiving notification that their application has been denied. If an asylum seeker fails to leave
within this time, then he must prove to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) that
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failure to leave was at no fault of his own, in which case, his stay in the asylum center can be
extended. If the asylum seeker does attempt to go through this secondary process after twentyeight days or cannot prove that failure to return was of no fault of his own, then he is evicted
from the asylum center (Government of the Netherlands 2016). The new policy also requires
asylum seekers to have proper documentation, with inadequate proof of origin resulting in a
denied application, and the cut off of support and shelter (Bahceli 2015).
The problem with this new refugee policy is in its failure to implement a mechanism that
actually ensures voluntary return. Instead, it ensures an increase in issues associated with
homelessness and individuals living on the street. Failed asylum seekers who are unable to leave
but can prove they are attempting to comply with voluntary return procedures, are able to stay
indefinitely in the centers as they work the system, while those who refuse to return or are unable
to do so due to lack of appropriate documentation and issues with their country of origin, are
simply forced out of the centers to live on the street. Undocumented migrants are also left out of
this new policy and will be forced to live on the street as they are denied access to the centers,
whereas the previous policy and its bed-bath-bread shelters were open to anyone claiming to be
an asylum seeker or refugee (Bahceli 2015).

Causes of the Problem
This section addresses the context and situations that led to the creation of the problem,
and provides the background information needed to understand the extent to which the problem
actually exists.

Refugee Crisis
The enduring conflict in Syria and the refugee crisis that has emerged from its chaos and
destruction has acted as a catalyst for the reevaluation of the international community’s
humanitarian policies. This is largely due to the fact that a mass influx of asylum seekers has
poured into the European Union for protection. Consequently, each member state has met
collectively with other members in order to discuss a way of dealing with the amount of fleeing
individuals. A concrete plan has yet to be developed. Instead, each state has reviewed their own
domestic policies to evaluate their efficiency in maintaining the international norms and their
system of governance capacity to enforce them. During these evaluations, policies have been
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adapted or changed to meet the current global environment. In this light, the refugee crisis in
itself, can be considered less of a problem relating to a large influx of individuals flooding
European borders, but rather a “crisis of policy” as depicted by Don Flynn, director of Migrant’s
Rights Network, in which joint and domestic policy is tested and purified by the strains put on
them during this period of vast migration (Flynn 2016).
The announcement of the new refugee policy in the Netherlands was made after a review
of its own domestic policies, in order to meet the challenges of the ongoing refugee crisis. The
government knew that the capacity of the state to accommodate incoming asylum seekers would
be strained, and therefore, sought to remove failed asylum seekers’ access to resources to free up
costs and accommodation for future applicants (NOS 2015). The IND had received a total of
24,535 asylum applications in 2014. This number was expected to double, and the government
received 34,958 by September 2015. The rejection rate of asylum seeker applications for this
first half of 2015 was at 30 percent (Dutch Council for Refugees 2015). Further information on
asylum applications per year can be found in the IND’s monthly Asylum Trends reports.

Anti-Immigration Political Stronghold
The majority of newspapers covering the policy change affecting failed asylum seekers,
describes the political deliberation as a strong arming of lesser parties by a powerful antiimmigration coalition party. Anti-immigration parties are described as increasing in popularity,
and thus, forcing its motives and ideals on the smaller member parties. Geert Wilders, head of
the Freedom Party (PVV) is a far-right politician whose popularity has increased due to his antiimmigration policies (Expatica 2015). Wilders party became the Netherlands’ second largest
party during elections in 2009 (Entzinger 2010, 231). After winning the majority of votes in
2012, the Liberal Party (VVD) has expressed that the refugee crisis and anti-immigration
discourse would make the Freedom Party (PVV) more popular in the coming elections
(Hauwermeiren 2015). The increase in political power of this anti-immigration party explains
where the new policy for refugees is coming from as it is an effect of anti-immigration ideas.

Parliamentary Crisis
While the refugee crisis has increased the popularity of some political parties in the
Netherlands, it has also increased political conflict. Prior to proposing to parliament the policy
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to close down the bed-bath-bread shelters and replacing them with asylum centers, members
within several of the parties and the heads of leading parties were in complete disagreement as to
what responsibility the state had in providing for failed asylum seekers and the effectiveness of
the proposed policy to motivate voluntary return. There were doubts that the policy would be
accepted by the parliament, let alone by asylum seekers and municipalities. The Deputy Prime
Minister Asscher stated that the policy was “above all a political deal primarily intended to avert
a government crisis”, referring to the possibility of a breakup of coalition parties if they remained
unable to come to an agreement (Wiegel 2015).
Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who competes against Geert Wilders for votes, and his
Liberal party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) struggled to persuade their
coalition Labour Party (PvdA) to support the policy. Rutte was a strong supporter of the policy
change, stating that providing resources to failed asylum seekers who could return to their
country of origin would be “crazy” (Bahceli 2015). However, the solution supported by Rutte is
again, similar to previous policies that were criticized due to a lack of provision of basic needs
for both applicants and failed asylum seekers. These past policies were also deemed inefficient
for improving voluntary return. This along with the fact that the proposed policy almost created
a government crisis provides no reassurance that the new refugee policy will actually work.
Furthermore, the new policy seems to have been created as a solution to a parliamentary conflict
versus a well thought out plan for dealing with the influx of refugees (Wiegel 2015).

The Schengen Agreement: Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 15 March 2006 Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the
Movement of Persons Across Borders
Regulation No. 562/2006 establishes the protocols that open the borders of member
states, otherwise recognized as the Schengen Borders Code. While it provides measures for
checkpoints and security along the exterior border of the Schengen area, the regulation “provides
for the absence of border control of persons crossing the internal borders between the Member
States of the European Union” (2006/562/EC, 3). It is important to note though, that neither the
United Kingdom nor Ireland take part in this agreement, although both are members of the EU.
What is significant about this international law is the challenge it poses member states
during the present refugee crisis. It allows refugees to flood certain member states once they
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have entered the Schengen border. Member states have threatened to close their own borders or
form a smaller Schengen agreement radius that bonds states more capable of keeping all
migrants outside its borders, and not allowing them entrance without going through the
appropriate immigration channels. The Netherlands has been one of these states proposing a
temporary reduced Schengen border which would exclude southern states such as Greece in
order to bolster its own security and better control the number of incoming asylum seekers. It
would also allow more capable states to protect citizens from threats such as Daesh who have
claimed to be infiltrating states with asylum seekers (Ottens 2015).
Despite some states’ own increase of border security and security checkpoints, the
Schengen agreement has continued to hold, allowing some asylum seekers to relocate to a
member state of preference after they have already registered in another state, a process which
complicates measures established by the Dublin Regulation. According to the Dublin
Regulation, it is the state of registration that holds and maintains the obligation to process an
individual’s asylum application and thereby grant residency. As a result, member states have
complained that the current Schengen agreement does not ensure asylum applicants stay in one
state, and again, allows them to flock and encumber preferred EU states (Bond 2016). Because
of the open borders, the same can be said in regards to failed asylum seekers. Once an
application has been denied and the conditions in a state are found to be undesirable for a failed
asylum seeker, there are no internal border security protocols that prevent an individual from
traveling to a state where failed asylum seekers are better accommodated. This can cause
flooding in a state similar to the refugee crisis, but this time because of more lenient asylum
policies which result in an uneven distribution of asylum seekers in the European Union. The
understanding of the complications of the Schengen Agreement as it is related to the refugee
crisis, continually contributes to the production of tough immigration policies produced by the
Netherlands (Ottens 2015).

Asylum Process
Now that the causes of the problem have been addressed, it is important to understand the
asylum application process and the extent to which the asylum procedure has changed. This will
allow for a better understanding of the effects and extent of the problem. The asylum seeking
process begins with individual’s registration with the Aliens Police at the Central Reception
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Facility in Ter Apel or at the Schiphol airport with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.
Registration at Ter Apel can take up to two days, but after this a “rest and preparation period” is
granted in which the Dutch Council for Refugees (VWN) will provide information and
legal/medical assistance over a period of no less than six days (IND 2016). The applicant is
instructed to stay in a “reception location” near one of the Immigration and Naturalisation
Service offices where the application will be submitted (IND 2016). Individuals at the Schiphol
reception center do not receive accommodation at a reception location for the duration of the rest
and preparation timeframe. Instead, they remain at the Schiphol reception center where they will
have access to legal/medical assistance within a few days of their stay. The application process
at the Schiphol center is slightly expedited for the many asylum seekers who arrive by plane, and
the application for asylum is submitted there (IND 2016).
All applicants then go through an interviewing process. If the application requires an
extended amount of time for review, the applicant is moved to a different reception center, and
the final decision will be made within a six month period. This process may also be extended for
an additional six months. Once an applicant is determined to be a refugee and granted asylum,
they are given a “temporary residence permit” that lasts for five years; after the five years, the
applicant can apply for a “permanent residence permit” if he qualifies (IND 2016).
The permanent residence permit may be denied if it is determined that the applicant no
longer fulfills the characteristics of a refugee which can occur when a conflict subsides. The
government produces a “safe list” in which applicants from regions that have been determined
safe are required to return upon the denying of their application. However, there is a chance that
countries on this list will revert back to an unsafe condition, in which time they may be taken off
the list (Government of the Netherlands 2016). An example of this process is seen in the
extension of asylum for Iraqis; denied applications were recently suspended due to the threat of
Daesh in the region (Dutch Council for Refugees 2016).
Individual asylum seekers can gain the initial temporary residence permit by meeting one
of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service’s qualifications. These qualifications are in place
to determine the applicant as a refugee and therefore, eligibility for asylum. When he meets the
qualifications he is considered to have a refugee status and given asylum along with the
temporary residence permit. An applicant may qualify for asylum if he fits the characteristics of
a refugee as determined by Article 1A of the Geneva Convention: “fear of being persecuted for
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reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion…” (Dutch Council for Refugees 2016). If the applicant does not meet these
characteristics, he may qualify under the conditions of subsidiary protection as described in
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 15 (c) of the Qualification
Directive (2011/95/EU) which further defines situations, such as the threat of serious harm, in
which a member state should not return an applicant to his country of origin (Dutch Council for
Refugees 2016).
A third condition in which asylum seekers can gain a temporary residence permit is
extended to family members of those who have already been granted asylum in the Netherlands.
A temporary residence permit can be granted if the individual had arrived with a said family
member or within three months of a family member’s granted asylum application date. This is
part of a family reunification process, and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service does not
indicate what family bond is required when submitting an application (IND 2016).
Altogether, requests for asylum and refugee residency permits can be denied if the
applicant had resided in or previously applied in another European Union state, if an application
for asylum in the Netherlands had been previously denied and no “new relevant facts” for
acceptance are available, if the applicant poses a “risk to public order and national security, or if
the applicant submits information that is incorrect (IND 2016).
When an asylum application is rejected, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service
provides a given date that is twenty- eight days from the day it was denied. An asylum seeker
must leave the Netherlands before this date. The denied applicant continues to receive financial
support from the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) during this period
of twenty-eight days (Government of the Netherlands 2016). If the applicant is in a situation
where he cannot leave of his own accord due to lack of funds or improper travel documents, he is
told to contact the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for assistance and financial
aid. Otherwise, the denied applicant can face deportation (IND 2016). The denied applicant may
also be forced to pay a deposit or be placed in a detention center if he is found to be somehow
evading the process of return. If return travel cannot be secured due to a missing document, the
Repatriation and Departure Service can “mediate” for the individual at their respective embassy
or consulate (Government of the Netherlands 2016). Any denied applicant can submit an appeal
to the Aliens Chamber within a week of the decision; stay in the Netherlands is only permitted if
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a preliminary ruling by the court is requested. Denied extended stay applicants have four weeks
to submit an appeal and are permitted to stay in the Netherlands. A denied applicant may again
apply for a residence permit if he can prove that he has exhausted all available resources and is
unable to leave the Netherlands “through no fault or action of your own” (IND 2016).
If the applicant has not submitted an appeal after his application has been denied during
any of the previously mentioned processes, he is completely cut off from government support at
the end of the designated date of departure. It is also at this point that he loses access to the
reception centers. This cut off of support and access to shelter is the change found in the new
refugee policy (Withnall 2015). Previously, the government allowed asylum seekers, despite the
condition of their status, to have access to the regional bed-bath-bread shelters. Under the new
policy, these shelters are closed and failed asylum seekers who cannot or will not return to their
country of origin are forced to live illegally without government accommodation (Waldron and
Ali 2015). A supplementary condition of the policy ensures that migrants in general do not have
access to shelters and basic provisions that was found in the bed-bath-bread regulation. The new
policy requires all migrants to register, be documented, and go through the residency application
process if they want to gain access to government support and accommodation. If an
undocumented migrant avoids registration and the proper application process, he can be detained
and eventually deported along with failed asylum seekers who do not cooperate with voluntary
return (Withnall 2015).

Scope and Magnitude of the Problem
This section identifies and addresses the effects of the new policy, and the extent to
which it creates a problem for the state. In all, the new refugee policy poses serious
ramifications for the state. Municipalities are in disagreement with the policy, and some have
refused to enforce it. The resistance of the policy could incite protests and national disorder. The
European Commission and the United Nations have criticized the new policy, claiming that it
goes against humanitarian law. The policy essentially places both failed asylum seekers and
undocumented migrants on the street after the government asylum process fails to return them to
their country of origin. Placing these individuals on the street does not meet the goal of
voluntary return. Instead, it makes individuals homeless, and an increase of homelessness incurs
several differing costs upon the state.
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Municipalities
Complications with the new refugee policy change are evident in its rejection by the
Netherlands’ own municipalities. Not wanting failed asylum seekers “living” on their streets,
they continue to provide them with food and shelter (The Economist 2015). While cities relied
on national funding for the regional shelters and asylum seeker provisions, some mayors have
refused to comply with the closing of the facilities, stating that they will look for alternative
funds in order to keep facilities open (Bahceli 2015). In refusing to enforce the policy, cities
undermine the effectiveness of the policy in its goal of incentivizing self-return. This situation is
similar to the undermining of asylum policy that occurred in 2001, when Utrecht first proposed
its own “‘bread, bed, and bath’ plan” to provide for denied asylum seekers despite the
Netherlands initiative to drive them out of the country within twenty-eight days of their
application’s rejection (Lovett and Schimmer 2001). Municipal undermining of state policy
threatens government legitimacy, and the process as a whole is a repetition of past events which
had resulted in the state’s increased responsibility in caring for failed asylum seekers found in
the bed-bath-bread regulation. Therefore, the current policy change is part of a cycle in which the
state is most likely going to have to reestablish means for caring for failed asylum seekers in the
future.

Protests and Noncompliance
Because the current refugee policy changes reflect the conditions set by previous
ineffective asylum policies, enforcement of this policy may result in a reoccurrence of problems
that require government and international organization intervention. Furthermore, the evicting of
failed asylum seekers and the decrease of available shelter may result in protests, and
consequently increased police confrontations, mirroring events that occurred in the Netherlands
in 2012. During that time, the Dutch government had created temporary structures of
accommodation for Iraqi asylum seekers. Residence was not granted to several of these asylum
seekers because of the changing conditions in Iraq. It was determined that the state was safe
enough for individuals’ to return. Again, failed asylum seekers were expected to leave either
voluntarily or forcibly after receiving notice of their applications. Despite Iraq being declared a
safe state, the Iraqi government refused to accept asylum seekers who had left during the war and
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now were being forced to return. This made it impossible for some of the asylum seekers to
return, making them reliant on Dutch services and accommodations (Kamphuis 2014).
When the asylum seekers were notified of their denied residency permits and that they
would have to leave their accommodations, the failed asylum seekers held a series of protests
throughout the Netherlands. The failed asylum seekers refused to comply with the Immigration
Services. As a result, the Dutch police had to forcibly evict asylum seekers, and close down
shelters. Non-government organizations, such as Vluchtkerk, then began to care for these
populations and complain about the conditions that state policy placed on failed asylum seekers
which lead to the European Committee of Social Rights’ 2013 ruling, the Netherlands must
provide for the basic needs of all individuals within its borders (Kamphuis 2014). Once again,
the new policy change is not necessarily a new policy, making it likely for a reoccurrence of past
events. While the possibility of protests and costs associated with increased use of the police
force remain, issues relating to humanitarian law have already been identified.

Humanitarian Law
The new refugee policy would seem a reasonable solution for motivating denied asylum
seekers to voluntarily return, but instead, it has been received with heavy criticism, and
implicates Netherlands’ parliament of non-compliance to humanitarian law. Prior to the new
policy’s announcement, the Netherlands had been struggling against allegations of inhumane
practices relating to undocumented migrants and asylum seekers within its borders. As
previously mentioned, the European Committee of Social Rights ruled that the Netherlands
needed to care for all individuals within its borders in 2013. In the fall of 2014, the Netherlands
was told by the Council of Europe that there is a legal responsibility to “ensure failed asylum
seekers” and other individuals living in the state, have the necessities for living such as food,
shelter, and clothing; following this, the United Nations sent the government an Urgent Appeal
Letter reminding the state of this responsibility in the coming winter months (Dutch News.nl
2014).
On the 16th of April 2015, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe made
follow up resolutions concerning complaints lodged by the European Federation of National
Organisations working with the Homeless and the Conference of European Churches. These
complaints were regarding the government of the Netherlands’ responsibility towards asylum
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seekers in providing food and shelter to “undocumented and homeless migrants” in accordance
to the European Social Charter. In the resolutions CM/ResChS(2015)4 and CM/ResChS(2015)5,
the Committee unanimously found the Netherlands in violation of Article 31 p.2 (right to
housing), Article 13 p.1 and 4 (right to social and medical assistance, Article 19 p.4(c) (right of
migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance), and Article 30 (right to
protection against poverty and social exclusion) (Glakoumopoulos 2015).
Since the announcement of the change of the new policy, negative critiques continue to
question the suitability of the reception center protocols. In August of 2015, a UN report from
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination negatively reviewed the changes,
stating that provisions must be made for maintaining minimal living standards (Deutsch 2015).
These considerations alone make it necessary for the Netherlands’ government to carefully
consider further initiatives in promoting self-expulsion, knowing that international pressures are
liable to make further accusations against the state. However, the Committee’s resolutions are
not “legally binding”, and therefore, do not maintain as much authority over domestic practices
as international and regional treaties such as those in the European Convention on Human Rights
(Sierra, Guettache, and Kovtun 2014, 5). During a case regarding an Iranian migrant’s right to
housing, The Netherlands’ State Council ruled that the “‘European Convention on Human Rights
does not oblige the government to unconditionally provide a roof to unsuccessful asylum
seekers’”, legitimizing the government’s new refugee policy, and allowing for its
implementation while ignoring international criticism of its stance towards failed refugees
(Expatica 2015). Despite the domestic ruling, the Netherlands must be prepared for continued
criticism of the new policy and the plausibility of future rulings and declarations made by the
international and regional bodies which may implicate the Netherlands of non-compliance to
humanitarian law. In the occurrence of such circumstances, the Netherlands may be required to
again change its domestic refugee policy or pay compensation to those made homeless by the
policy.

Homelessness
The closing down of the bed-bath-bread shelters and the eviction of failed asylum seekers
to the street will have various social and economic ramifications as the process makes these
individuals homeless. Homelessness impacts every state and society differently. This and a
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general underreporting of failed asylum seekers by homeless services makes it difficult to
examine the extent to which failed asylum seekers living on the street would impact the Dutch
kingdom. Also, some organizations are reluctant because of their service mandate, to report
immigrants residing in the country illegally to Dutch authorities (Pleace 2010, 149-150). Yet,
analysis has been conducted outlining the general impact of homelessness in the European
Union, which allows one to recognize that there is an increase in costs associated with the
increase of individuals living on the street.
The European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless
(FEANTSA), a non-government organization, outlined possible financial costs of an increase in
homelessness in their 2013 report on “The Costs of Homelessness in Europe”. In the report the
European Observatory on Homelessness (EOH) highlighted a cost increase in several services
that are directly related to supporting homeless individuals. The first cost increase associated
with homelessness is found in the provision of services for the homeless, as money would have
to be allocated to an increase in “specialist, specific services that are targeted on preventing,
reducing or mitigating the effects of homelessness” (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and BuschGeertsema 2013, 11). Various organizations that work towards poverty reduction and issues
relating to homelessness would find themselves increasingly taxed for resources as failed asylum
seekers would flock to these services. The organizations would then have to petition for an
increase in financial support from government and other funding institutions to ensure they can
continue to provide for these homeless individuals.
The second noticeable increase in costs would include an increase in financial strain
within the health and social sector. Homeless individuals, especially failed asylum seekers
unaccustomed to the weather conditions of the Netherlands, may be more susceptible to illnesses
while living on the street. There is a possibility that the harsh conditions that homeless
individuals endure may prompt them to use “emergency medical and psychiatric services” more
than the general public (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-Geertsema 2013, 11). This
increase in use of medical facilities would require more state investment as medical resources are
spent treating the homeless.
The third cost increase involves the judicial system. There would be an increase in costs
for the criminal justice system as homeless individuals have more contact with enforcement
officers due to legality issues of squatting and other street living practices. Some common issues
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that cause homeless individuals to fall into the criminal justice system involve the public use of
alcohol and unconventional drugs which can make them violent and aggressive towards others
(Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-Geertsema 2013, 11).
Homeless individuals also influence economic productivity, which is especially true for
failed migrants. Because these individuals often lack access to legitimate work, the government
and society loses the opportunity to capitalize on these individuals. When asylum seekers are
granted a work permit, the government is able to tax these individuals’ income, allowing the
state economy to fully profit from their labor and work contributions. Failed asylum seekers
have no access to legitimate work because they are not granted a working permit that is
associated with their residency application. Therefore, these individuals have to resort to
illegitimate work for money which may involve criminality, negating any profit for the state, and
possibly creating further criminal judiciary costs (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and BuschGeertsema 2013, 12). An increase of homeless individuals on the street may also affect tourism,
as tourists’ preference of destinations may change do to appearances of people living in harsh
conditions or crowding streets. Furthermore, homelessness may affect “trade” and “societal
cohesion” as their presence on streets and in various neighborhoods reduces the value and
perception of wealth of the location (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-Geertsema 2013,
12).
Lastly, as determined by the FEANTSA report, homelessness may also have a direct
negative impact on the failed asylum seeker as he is forced to live an un-opportunistic life style.
Living as a homeless individual can result in “negative long term social, economic and health
consequences” for failed asylum seekers, as the conditions to which they are daily exposed to,
and the lack of legal working opportunities, increasingly jeopardizes their social and physical
health, and prevents them from accumulating wealth (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and BuschGeertsema 2013, 12).

2) Evaluation Criteria
Goals of the Policy
In its essence, the new refugee policy was created to meet the following three goals:
incentivize voluntary return for denied asylum seekers, free-up provisions for incoming asylum
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seekers, and avert a government crisis caused by parliamentary party disagreement on how to
deal with refugees. As such, these goals were also the desired outcomes, but as seen through the
discussion on the effects of the problem, the policy has created immediate and the possibility of
several undesirable outcomes. These outcomes are discussed in the following section.

Outcomes
While the ultimate goals of the refugee policy included the free-up of provisions for
incoming asylum seekers, the aversion of a government crisis, and incentivizing voluntary
return, the only viewable desirable outcomes noticed in the literature could be the fact that the
state reduced costs associated with providing failed asylum seekers indefinite provisions and
shelter when they closed down the regional shelters. Another desirable outcome would be the
fact that the refugee policy did avert a government crisis when the parties agreed on its measures.
The last desirable outcome is that the new policy actually requires all statuses of asylum seekers
to comply with state regulations prior to receiving government assistance. What is missing from
these desirable outcomes is the incentivizing of voluntary return as there is no information that
would demonstrate that the policy is actually efficient in this aspect. Instead, the International
Organization for Migration in the Netherlands says that “involuntary and voluntary returns are
interlinked and have a mutually reinforcing effect. A number of European states have found that
voluntary return has been most successful where involuntary return is also resorted to” (IOM
2004, 7).
Statistics of those who have used the Netherlands’ assisted voluntary return program
show that in 2015, 2,941 failed asylum seekers returned which is an increase from 2,269 in 2014
and 2,489 in 2013, but these statistics are significantly lower than those from 2011 when 3,473
used the assisted program (IOM 2015). The asylum requests for 2015 and 2014 were higher than
that of 2011 with a total of 45,035 and 24,535 applications. In 2013, there were 13,095 asylum
applications and 14,630 in 2011 (StatLine 2016). These statistics indicate that either there is no
correlation between asylum applications and voluntary return, or that voluntary return is
decreasing despite new initiatives to incentivize the process. These statistics though, are not
indicative of how many failed asylum seekers returned without government assistance as there is
no monitoring system in place that would allow for such evaluation. So it is possible that there
has been an increase of failed asylum seekers leaving of their own accord.
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As previously stated, the undesirable outcomes are the negative effects of the new
refugee policy. A list of the desirable and undesirable outcomes is easily visible in the following
table.

Desirable Outcomes

Undesirable Outcomes

Reduction of Government Funded

Municipality Resistance

Asylum Shelters

-undermining of government legitimacy
-reduction of the policy’s efficiency
-future change or reversal of the refugee policy

Protests and Noncompliance
-confrontation of failed asylum seekers with government authorities
-NGOs step in to care for failed asylum seekers, undermining policy efficiency

Conflict Regarding Refugee Policies

Increased Allegations of Humanitarian Law Non-Compliance

within Parliament Subsided

-submission of complaints by individuals and organizations to regional and international
human rights bodies
-International and regional organizations’ ruling against the Netherlands’ refugee policy
-compensation having to be paid by the state
-future change or reversal of the refugee policy

Asylum Seekers Have to Register and

Increased Costs associated with Homelessness

Comply with Protocols to Receive

-homelessness services

Government Assistance

-health and service sector
-criminal judicial system
-economic productivity

Quantifying Illegal Stay
Once again, determining the impact of homelessness is difficult due to under reporting.
This is also true of failed asylum seekers and illegal stay migrants in general. Estimations of the
total amount of failed asylum seekers remaining in the Netherlands illegally would help indicate
to what extent the new refugee policy is needed in incentivizing voluntary return, and also
whether it is failing in its initiative of increasing return to countries of origin. Determining the
total amount of individuals residing in the Netherlands illegally is a difficult task due to the fact
that many remain undocumented, especially failed asylum seekers who do not register to use
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available resources for voluntary return or refuse to comply with the return process altogether.
Eurostat collected statistics on migrants illegally residing in the Netherlands from 2008 to 2012.
The statistics indicate the numbers of illegally residing migrants falling prior to 2012. The
highest recorded presence of these migrants being from third world countries was at a high in
2010 at 7,580 and fell to 6,145 in 2011 (Eurostat 2015). These figures can be compared to the
total asylum applications that occurred within this period; there was an overall decrease of
applications in 2010 from 12,700 to 11,300 in 2011 (IND 2012, 16). The correlation of the
statistics of both the number of illegal residencies and total applications may be indicative of a
relationship in which the increase of one means an increase of the other. Despite this
observation, these figures are hardly indicative of the current amount of undocumented migrants
residing in the state now since the asylum seekers have surpassed a record of application
submissions, totaling over 53,000. This application record was set during the 1994 conflicts in
Yugoslavia (Pieters 2015). Altogether, the IND reported a total of 58,880 applications for the
year 2015, and stated that this figure nearly doubled the total of applications from 2014 (IND
2016).
Ultimately, only estimations can be made in regards to the total amount of undocumented
or illegal stay migrants within the Netherlands. Humanity in Action estimated that around 5,000
individuals became undocumented post the government’s denial of 9,810 asylum applications in
2012. Amnesty International said this denial rate was 56% of all asylum applications (Sierra,
Guettache, and Kovtun 2014, 6). A report produced by Vluchtelingenwerk, a Dutch organization
that works directly with refugees, estimated that around 5,000 of rejected asylum seekers
remained in the Netherlands in 2014 while total applications for asylum were over 24,000 (The
Economist 2015). Wereldhuis or Worldhouse, a resource center for migrants, estimates that
around 15,000 undocumented reside solely in Amsterdam, having come to the Netherlands by
various means such as human trafficking, and for various reasons (wereldhuis 2016). However,
upon questioning the organization in regards to this statistic, it appears that its estimation is
rather outdated, and also non-indicative of today’s totals. Despite this, the statistic was
calculated through a process of cross-referencing numbers of illegally residing migrants that
were arrested by the police, a process which provides a calculation based off of actual
government documentation (Heijden, Gils Cruijff, and Hessen 2006). Other media sources
estimate a total of 100,000 undocumented individuals living in the entire state (Expatica 2015).
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Another way to try and determine the extent of undocumented or illegal stay migrants in
the Netherlands would be to consider rates of return. According to statistics gathered on
migrants who entered the Netherlands in 1995, one in three immigrants returned home after six
years, and it was noted that asylum seekers were less prone to leave (CBS 2003). Aside from
this information, there appears to be no data collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
in the Netherlands, regarding the return of asylum seekers or migrants to their country of origin
within more recent years.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains statistical
reports on the Netherlands. The agency reported a total of 82,494 refugees living in the
Netherlands in June of 2015. The UNHCR determined who qualified as a refugee for the
statistics with the descriptions indicated by international law, by the total of individuals who
gained some degree of protection, and by determining if an individual was in a refugee like
condition within the Netherlands. At the same time, the UNHCR reported a total of 8,097
pending applications, and determined a total of 1,951 stateless people residing within the border.
However, as far as the total of returned for the first half of 2015, the UNHCR had no statistical
data on how many failed refugees were returned to their country of origin, neither was there any
accessible data from previous years for further estimations (UNHCR 2016). Furthermore, the
only real viable indication to determine the extent of illegal stay or failed asylum seekers and
whether they pose a serious threat to the state of Netherlands would be visible in an increase of
crime or public squatting. These indicators were proposed by those in opposition of the policy
change, believing the closure of the shelters would force individuals to a life of crime and
violence while living on the streets (Darroch 2014). Therefore, future evaluation of the
efficiency of failed asylum seeker policies should rely on failed asylum seeker crime reports if
they are accessible.

Assessing Alternatives
In assessing alternatives, it is important to evaluate options while keeping the goals of
the current or new policy in mind. By doing this, it will be possible to establish whether an
alternative satisfies the goals or objectives established by the government, and increase the
likelihood of it being accepted by parliament. The alternatives must also be considered in
relation to their costs and benefits, knowing that a policy in which the costs outweigh the total
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number of benefits is not likely to be accepted, and that if certain costs are too high, it may prove
difficult for the state to implement. A thorough comparison of costs and benefits will be laid out
in the fourth section for an easy comparison.

3) Alternative Policies and Their Assessment
This section includes an examination of various ideas and policies concerning failed
asylum seekers, and provides suggestions for improvements in consideration to their
implementation. A cost benefit analysis is provided for each suggestion, highlighting the
difficulties and expenditures associated with each respectively, and how adjustment of ideas to
the circumstances in the Netherlands can either improve the current asylum policy or be
emplaced as a substitutive solution.

Return Expansion
The Netherlands can expand the initiative to assist countries in receiving returned
refugees. This alternative is part of an initiative that is already being considered in the
Netherlands, and its expansion would increase the efficiency of the voluntary return policy as it
makes provisions for failed asylum seekers in their country of origin so that they can and will
want to return. In April of 2015, the Dutch government put forward a plan to provide funds from
the Development and Cooperation budget to assist African nations in building shelter and
accommodations for returning refugees. This initiative was proposed to correspond with the
closing down of the several asylum centers, and was meant to increase the overall incentives for
voluntary return. However, the proposed plan is limited in efficiency as it does not consider
failed asylum seekers from other regions. This initiative is limited to a specific region. For a
more beneficial application, it should be extended to other countries which have a high rate of
asylum seeker applicants in the Netherlands. Such an agreement should be considered for states
located in the Middle East that have been declared safe, knowing that the conflicts in this region
has likely destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals (Bilak et al. 2015, 9).
As far as costs, the funds should continue to be exchanged with states for cooperation in
accepting failed asylum seekers. It is possible that the funds will actually help initiate
cooperation with states where returns were previously not accepted. The cost of the initial
project was expected to start at 30 million euros with an increase over time. Part of this budget
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was meant for the North African Search and Rescue missions, while the rest was to be allocated
to African countries that cooperate in the return of refugees (Pieters 2015). This cost would have
to rise significantly as funds would be allocated to other regions, and the Dutch government
would have to locate other local or regional organizations to oversee the construction of shelter
for returning asylum seekers in these other regions.
In critical examination of this initiative, it is practical in cases where individuals decide to
return voluntarily, but it does nothing to address the cases where failed asylum seekers cannot
return to country of origin or refuse to return. It is these two groups of asylum seekers that make
shutting down several of the asylum centers extremely problematic. Forced returns are often
costly as it requires a government to charter a plane and personnel that will assist with the return
of an individual. For example, in 2009, it cost Norway between 8,700-9,500 euros per individual
for their forcible return while assisted voluntary programs only cost the state 1,300 euros per
individual. Sweden’s forced return cost an average of 6,500 euros per individual while voluntary
return assistance programs cost the state an average 600 euros. The United Kingdom’s estimated
average of forced return per individual, nearly doubles both countries’ statistics as its costs were
around 14,500 euros in 2009 to 2010 (Black, Collyer, and Somerville 2011, 5).

It is because of

these associated high costs, that the Netherlands’ government emphasizes voluntary return
(Economist 2015). In failing to motivate or provide the conditions in which failed asylum
seekers can and will return, forced returns would be the only remaining option outside of
granting temporary residency. This contribution in costs would question the efficiency of the
voluntary return, and whether the money could be better invested. Altogether, this alternative
does not propose any real solution that ensures return. Instead, its benefits are found in its
increase of cooperation and relationships with countries of origin, and making it more likely for
the country of origin to accept forced returns.

Cost Contribution
The Dutch government could expand its current policy that requires some asylum seekers
to contribute towards the cost of provisions, to include failed asylum seekers in exchange for
continued accommodation. This process has already been in practice since 2008 for asylum
seekers with high earnings, and it has been enforced by the refugee settlement agency (COA). It
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has been reported by the Dutch News that the government collected 700,000 Euros from asylum
seekers within the past four years (2016).
The initiative to require payment for use of shelters and provisions could take the place
of the current policy in which several of the asylum centers have been shut down and failed
asylum seekers are given a certain amount of time to comply with voluntary return measures
before being evicted to the streets. The policy would allow shelters to stay open as all asylum
seekers would continue to reside in them; the only change would be in the requirement that
individuals continue to have to pay for the use of facilities and provisions after their application
has been denied. Under this policy, the government would still be providing shelter for failed
asylum seekers, and eliminate the criticisms that the state is not abiding by humanitarian law.
This would also legally mitigate state costs associated with an increase in homelessness that
evicting failed asylum seekers would induce. The costs could also create a small incentive for
asylum seekers to return as they would realize they would have to pay for temporary lodging
until they leave the Netherlands, and allow the government to collect payments from failed
asylum seekers.
The current policy relating to the contribution of accommodation costs requires asylum
seekers to pay money to the COA if their earnings are over 5,895 Euros. There is a deduction
from 11,790 Euros in earnings for an entire family. Also, an asylum seeker must pay 196 Euros
a month if he or she earns more than 185 Euros a week (Dutch News.nl 2016). This cost can
either be lowered or remain the same for failed asylum seekers, but in order to ensure that failed
asylum seekers are able to pay such costs, it may be necessary to provide them with a conditional
work visa in which they are allowed to legally work and earn an income. Otherwise, failed
asylum seekers may be prompted to work illegally within their own social networks (Siegel
2011). Yet, this alternative again fails to provide a mechanism for return, and as such, fails to
ensure voluntary return actually occurs.

Criminalization of Assistance
One alternative that can be implemented in order to increase the efficiency of the new
policy meant to increase voluntary return by the discontinuation of support for non-compliant
failed asylum seekers, could be the criminalizing of support for undocumented migrants. The
Dutch government could make it illegal to provide shelter and assistance to failed asylum
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seekers. According to an interview with Merijn Oudenampsen, a sociologist who worked
directly with failed asylum seekers who were evicted from shelters in 2012, a policy regarding
the criminalization of support for failed asylum seekers was already proposed by members of
Dutch parliament, but it never received enough support. This criminalization policy was
supported by the Deputy Justice Minister Red Teevan, the Freedom Party (PVV), and the
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Its purpose was to criminalize various
organizations that provide aid to failed asylum seekers after they had been evicted from
temporary shelters, a process that undermined voluntary return to countries of origin (RNW
2012).
Before the criminalization of support could take effect, the policy would have to be more
widely supported by the other parliamentary parties. Chances of this occurrence may be small
since there remains a large amount of opposition towards the current asylum policy and laws
regulating immigration (Devaney 2015). If the criminalization policy does receive support and is
implemented, it could result in a systematic claim of ignorance in which various organizations
claim they do not know the status of individuals’ residency, undermining the efficiency of such a
policy. It is already understood that a number of organizations do not require individuals to
provide documentation regarding their residency status prior to providing assistance, nor do all
organizations report undocumented migrants to government authorities (Pleace 2010, 150). An
enforcement mechanism would have to be put in place. A mechanism that would ensure
organizations are held liable for their knowledge of aiding the undocumented. The government
could require organizations to collect documents regarding migrants’ residency prior to
providing assistance. This however, may not be enforceable in situations where organizations do
not collect government funding, or work in municipalities that have refused to comply with the
conditions set by the state. Aside from this defect, there could be other negative outcomes that
result from the criminalization process. This could include an increase in black market forgery
and use of unofficial channels to secure documentation. Individuals may resort to forgery and
fraudulent manipulation of documents so that they can access various state provisions and aid
provided by non-government organizations, a practice that can put them at risk of being
manipulated or in harm’s way as they are reliant on individuals working outside the legality of
the state (Siegel 2011). This alternative may increase the efficiency of the new refugee policy as
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it illegalizes outside assistance of failed asylum seekers, but this process also further contributes
to the homelessness effects as it does not ensure voluntary return.

Transfer to Detention Centers
Another possible alternative is to transfer failed asylum seekers who refuse to comply
with return preparations immediately to detention shelters after the twenty-eight day period.
This would ensure that government authorities could keep track of failed asylum seekers, and
ensure they do not attempt to reside within the state without legal residency. It is in compliance
with Directive 2008/115/EC, Chapter IV, Article 15, relating to detention for the purpose of
removal. This directive allows for a state to place a failed asylum seeker in detention if he
“avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process” (2008/115/EC, 105). Also,
according to Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 and the recast Directive
2013/33/EU, the Netherlands maintains the right to establish the location of asylum seekers’
residence in accordance with its own domestic law, and can reduce asylum seekers freedom of
movement to a designated area as long as it does not interfere with an individual’s right to
private life and rights guaranteed by the protocol. Asylum seekers can even be confined to a
specific location when there are legality concerns. These directives justify the use of detention
for noncomplying failed asylum seekers
Transferring uncooperative failed asylum seekers would mitigate the need for the
provision of shelter at asylum centers and other organizations, and meet the demands of
international organizations in attending to individuals’ needs of provisions and shelter.
However, the conditions of detention centers would have to be reevaluated as the Dutch
government currently receives criticism for its use of detention centers and treatment of asylum
seekers along with the protocols practiced within them. Critiques of the detention centers
involve concerns of humanitarian law, in which case, failure to address these concerns could
have the potential to cause more issues than that seen in the removal of the bed-bath-bread policy
for failed asylum seekers.
An example of an improved and rights based asylum detention system is seen in Sweden.
In Sweden’s detention centers, asylum seekers have the freedom to walk around outside in a
garden, they have a key to their own room, they have internet access and are allowed to keep
their cellphones, and they can order food and groceries from nearby markets. Sweden’s centers
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are setup quite unlike that of a prison. They are also allowed to have daily visitors, and are not
subjugated to searches, a critique Dutch detention centers are known for (Kamphuis 2014). This
alternative emplaces a mechanism that ensures return, but it does not negate the high costs
associated with forced returns. Altogether, the costs associated with changing the detention
centers, continued provisional support, and forced returns may make this alternative the most
costly of those suggested.

Do Nothing Scenario
The last alternative is the do nothing scenario in which the Netherlands leaves the new
policy in place as it is. The effects of this scenario include those as previously discussed in
association with the problem, and it allows for the aversion of conflict regarding the issue within
the parties of parliament until the political stronghold changes. In the future, the parties may
either take a more collective stance on anti-immigration policies, or an accepting point of view
on the matter. However, it must be noted that anti-immigration policies have increased in the
Netherlands since 2001, and the government’s responsibility for caring for all asylum seeker
despite their application status has been a conflicting issue since that time as well (Muus 2004,
264). Ultimately, the debate of whether or not the Netherlands is responsible for providing food
and shelter for failed asylum seekers can be seen as being stuck in a repetitive cycle. The
government removes provisions, and individuals, municipalities, and various organizations
complain (Lovett and Schimmer 2001). The government then reinstates some sort of provision
for care for failed asylum seekers (Kamphuis 2014). It is in this practice that gives evidence of
the government’s failure to concretely answer the question of state responsibility since the
beginning of the last decade.
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4) Display and Distinguishing of Alternatives

Alternatives
Return Expansion

Cost Contribution

Costs
-significant increase from
proposed 30 million euros

Benefits

Conclusion

-possible incentivizing of return

No mechanism that ensures
return

-forced returns

-possible increase in state of
origin’s cooperation

-reopening of shelters and

-failed asylum seekers

provision of government
assistance

contribute in paying costs
-possible incentivizing of return
-reduce costs associated with
homelessness

Criminalization

Detention

No mechanism that ensures
return
Conditional work visas
may be necessary

-possible noncompliance which
undermines efficiency

-avoid further criticisms of HL
noncompliance
-increases efficiency of the new
refugee policy

No mechanism that ensures
return

-need for an enforcement
mechanism

-punishes those that undermine
the policy

Parliamentary parties may
not support it

-increase in use of unofficial
channels
-HL allegations if conditions are
not improved
-government provisions

Do Nothing

Increases receiving state’s
cooperation

-Mechanism ensures return
-may incentivize compliance
and voluntary return

-forced returns

-provides failed asylum seekers
with food and shelter

-noncompliance diminishes
efficiency

-government reduce costs

-possible resistance
-homelessness and its effects on
state services
-possible HL allegations

associated with providing
unconditional food and shelter
-parliament subverts further
refugee disagreement

Possible increase in
criminal activities
Ensures return through
one means or the other
Conditions and protocols of
detention centers would
have to be improved
No mechanism that ensures
return
Policy fails to be different
from previous policies
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5) Policy Evaluation
As the previous two sections indicate, the new refugee policy has resulted in several
undesirable outcomes and has the propensity to increase state costs. There is no indication that it
will incentivize return, and the absence of a monitoring mechanism outside the use of the
voluntary return assistance program makes further evaluation of its efficiency difficult. The new
policy’s protocol of evicting noncompliant failed asylum seekers and undocumented migrants to
the streets excludes them from a monitoring process and a mechanism for return. As discussed
in the section on quantifying illegal stay, information on these individuals would have to be
gathered from organizations who work directly with them and from criminal arrest records.
With an estimation of these statistics, then it may be possible for the government to assess the
effectiveness of the policy in the coming years.

The Alternative
Moving forward, it is suggested that the state reopen the shelters, and start a cost
contribution program for failed asylum seekers. This alternative presents the least amount of
costs for the government, and it would mitigate further criticisms that try to implicate the
Netherlands of noncompliance to humanitarian law. It also allows for better monitoring of these
individuals, and can prevent them from criminal activity and the negative effects associated with
homelessness. The easiest course of action for implementing this alternative would be the
reopening of several regional shelters that were closed. The total number of shelters needed to
be reopened is dependent upon how full the current asylum centers are and the number of failed
refugees requiring shelter. Because an accurate estimation of how many failed asylum seekers
requiring shelter cannot be determined due to the fact that the state loses monitoring capabilities
when they are released to the street, more shelters can be opened as the number of failed asylum
seekers requiring shelter increase. So capacity of asylum reception centers should be evaluated,
and based on that information, a few shelters can be opened until it is deemed necessary to open
some more. Once again, this alternative requires failed asylum seekers to have a source of
income. To ensure asylum seekers in general do not resort to unconventional or illegal means
for acquiring wealth, it is necessary that the Immigration and Naturalisation Service provide
these individuals with conditional work permits. This process will allow them access to the legal
labor market which will benefit state economy.
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